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TORT LIABILITY OF STORE MANAGER TO BUSINESS
INVITEES OF THE CORPORATE EMPLOYER
By S. Sheldon Weinhaust
When a business visitor suffers injury in either a large chain store,
department store, chain restaurant, theatre, service station or other
similar enterprise, he (or more correctly his attorney) generally de-
termines immediately that the owner-operator shall pay in damages
for the injuries that have resulted. At the present time, the owner-
operator of the large stores and other places of business is usually a
corporation rather than an individual or a partnership. If there is
negligence, whether it be a negligent employee or a defective condi-
tion which was or should have been known, the corporate owner is
liable.
The basis of this liability is twofold. First, under the general prin-
ciples of agency and tort, the master is liable for the torts of its
servants committed in the course of their employment-the doctrine
of respondeat superior. And, secondly, as a possessor of land, the
corporate owner or lessee is liable for defective conditions. Since the
corporate master-owner is liable for both negligence of employees
and defective conditions of land, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
easily applies to the corporate owner as well. E.g., a customer while
walking through the auto accessory department is hit by a tire un-
expectedly and unexplainably thrown from a tire mounting machine
then in semi-automatic operation. Since the throwing of the tire is
more than likely due either to a defective condition in the machine
itself, for which the corporate possessor is liable, or to its negligent
operation by an employee, for which the corporate master is liable,
and since the "more likely than not" requirements are met, there is
no reason why res ipsa loquitur should not be applied.
The attorney may or may not be satisfied with making the cor-
porate owner the sole defendant of a personal injury suit. If there
exists any basis for finding any employee of the corporation liable,
the attorney will probably want to join the employee as defendant.
One of the main reasons for this is to keep the matter in the chosen
state forum. If the employer is a foreign corporation, joining a resi-
dent employee will preclude removal to the federal district court on
the grounds of diversity of citizenship. However, except in the case
of a positive act by some employee-e.g., intentional torts such as
assault, defamation, or false imprisonment-one can rarely find
' Member of the Missouri and Arizona Bars; associated with Morris J. Levin,
St. Louis, Missouri.
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reason to make the individual employee liable. For example, which
employee could be sued if a business invitee falls due to a slippery
substance on the floor? Certainly, not the sales force. A person on the
janitorial force perhaps, but proof would be difficult in any event, if
not impossible, as would finding a "duty" to the business invitee,
although this latter problem is not insurmountable. The problem is
similar in a case in which the customer trips due to a small hole in
the floor, or in the "flying tire" example above.
There appears one exception to the above statement in regard to
liability of an individual employee. It may be that the manager of
the operation' is liable, although this suggestion usually evokes dis-
belief that one who himself is a subordinate should be liable together
with his master, assuming that the manager has committed no affir-
mative act of negligence. An extension of the doctrine of vicarious
liability to include managers is, however, worthy of notice. Joining
the manager may be important to prevent removal from the state to
the federal forum. But more important, if one should carry the
manager's vicarious liability to its logical extreme, then even the
small storekeeper who has incorporated his small business to protect
himself personally from claims against the corporation is nonetheless
liable for personal injuries, the corporate mode of protection being
of no effect.
The purpose of this article is to consider the basis by which vicari-
ous liability may extend to the manager. As indicated above, there
are two bases for the liability of the corporation: one is as the ulti-
mate master, the other as possessor and occupier of land. Do the same
bases apply to the manager?
THE MANAGER AND THE LAW OF AGENCY
There is no question but that the corporate occupier-operator-
master of the retail outlet owes a duty of due care to its business in-
vitees. This is well accepted hornbook law. The liability is usually
discussed in terms of an occupier of land,2 but the basis of liability
is not the mere possession of land, especially when the possessor is a
corporation and possession is accomplished only through subordinate
individuals. Liability then hangs on the verge of being vicarious, if it
is not actually vicarious, and this is all the more true when the
negligent defect is not merely a condition of the land, but the result
of negligence of an employee, as when a store employee stacks goods
1. Manager is used in this article as an all-inclusive term. It includes primarily
those in charge of retail merchandising outlets and other forms of commercial
outlets, but it also applies to many other types of supervisors and superintendents,
whenever applicable.
2. See, e.g., Prosser, Torts §§ 75-80 (2d ed. 1954).
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dangerously high on a counter. In res ipsa loquitur cases, as in the
"tire throwing" example above, liability must be vicarious, since
theoretically there is no way to handle or distinguish the acts of the
employee (the operation) from the possible defective conditions.
Liability of the corporation is justified by sound social philosophy.
The corporation is better equipped to handle and distribute the risk.
In addition, the corporation is the possessor through those it controls
and over whom it is the ultimate master. The corporation is the final
arbiter. However, one cannot say the same thing about the manager
of the retail outlet. The manager is in a far different position from
his master as to the employees under him. He is not liable to them
for their compensation, he cannot claim their loyalty in his own right,
he is not owed any fiduciary duties, nor will his own termination of
employment terminate the employer-employee relationship of any
other s
Section 220 of the Restatement of Agency sets out the essential
element necessary for a subordinate employee to be considered a
servant in the master-servant relationship: he must be subject to
control, and control is "sole" control. Mechem points out4 that in the
final analysis there can only be one master. If control must be uni-
tary, then the real control is that of the corporate employer who
exercises it through his control of the supervisor. Thus, the manager
is not and cannot be the master; he is simply a "conduit of commu-
nication."5
If there is no master-servant relationship, then the basis on which
vicarious liability is imposed on the corporate master is lacking in
an attempt to impute the negligence of a subordinate employee to the
superior employee (the manager) who is acting under the direction
and control of both his and his subordinates' employer.6 The majority
of courts have adopted this view.
Cases concerning "activities," as opposed to "conditions," best
exemplify the majority view.7 Consider an assault by the subordinate
3. Seavey, Subagents and Subservants, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 658 (1955). For an
interesting comment on this article, although not pertinent to the problem herein
discussed, see Millner, Sub-agents and Sub-servants, 73 So. African L.J. 85 (1956).
4. Mechem, Outlines Agency § 416 (4th ed. 1952).
5. Hewett v. Swift, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 420, 425 (1862).
Nonetheless, some courts may find sufficient "control" by the manager to con-
sider him a master. See, e.g., Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 485, 79
S.W.2d 447, 455 (1934) (dictum).
6. The text writers agree: Mechem, Outlines Agency § 346 (4th ed. 1952);
Paley, Principal and Agent 226 n.(k) (1) (2d Am. ed. 1822); Seavey, Studies
in Agency 9 n.21 (1949) ; Story, Agency § 201 (4th ed. 1851).
7. This is because issues of liability of possessors of land are not present to
confuse the problem as they might otherwise do. See, e.g., Stith v. J. J. Newberry
Co., 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447 (1934).
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employee. In Weis v. Skinner8 the manager of a theatre, who was
authorized to transact all business and to do all things necessary in
regard to the local business of the theatre, was held not liable to a
paying theatre-goer who was forcefully ejected from his seat and
from the theatre by a subordinate employee. The court correctly
treated the manager as another employee of the ultimate proprietor.
The fact that the employee acts under general orders of the manager
to keep people out of or off the master's premises is not sufficient
to impute liability.9 It might be said that in the case of any type of
intentional trespassory act by the subordinate employee, the superior
servant is not responsible vicariously solely on the basis of his super-
visory capacity.10
However, intentional trespasses are only a very small part of tort
litigation. Generally, the servant is simply negligent and his super-
visor is not held liable. For example: a bible school superintendent
was held not liable to a pupil for the negligent driving of one of the
teachers who was in the process of taking students to a recreation
area;" a general superintendent of blasting operations was held not
liable to persons hit by fragments of rock;12 a superintendent of min-
ing operations was held not vicariously liable for subsidence of plain-
tiff's overlying land ;13 a property manager was held not liable for
negligent repairs of porch railing by a carpenter he had hired to a
tenant who fell from the porch and suffered injuries.? Hence, one
8. 178 s.w. 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
9. Hewett v. Swift, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 420 (1862); Canfield v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry., 59 Mo. App. 354 (1894).
10. Bacheller v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 253 (1878) (trespass q.c.f.); Bath v. Caton,
37 Mich. 199 (1877) (trespass q.c.f.). See Story, Agency § 313 (4th ed. 1851).
11. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 378, 232 P.2d 241, 254 (1951) (respondeat
superior not applicable to the relationship between a supervisor and his sub-
ordinate employees).
12. Brown v. Lent, 20 Vt. 529, 533 (1848) (supervisor termed a "mere middle-
man" and an intermediate agent who would not be held vicariously liable).
13. Stone v. Cartwright, 6 Term R. 411, 101 Eng. Rep. 622 (K.B. 1795).
14. White v. Macoubray, 309 Pa. 266, 163 Atl. 521 (1932). It should be noted
that in this case and in Stone v. Cartwright, supra note 13, the courts treated
the person in charge of the property as an employing agent. Quaere what the
results would have been had the person in charge been treated as an occupier of
land so that the court need not have considered the relation between the ultimate
master and the subordinate employee. See text infra. It would appear that the
supervisors should have been treated as possessors and the negligence of the
subordinate employee as a condition rather than an operation. But, treated as the
courts treat them-as intermediaries-the results with regard to these defendants
seem correct.
Sometimes one might get the impression that a court is desirous of freeing all
persons from liability, except, of course, the corporate master. Thus, in Atter-
bury v. Temple Stephens Co., 353 Mo. 5, 181 S.W.2d 659 (1944), where plaintiff
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might properly conclude that the doctrine of respondeat superior does
not apply to intermediaries in a chain of employment between the
ultimate master and the subordinate servant.r Generally, it is this
writer's feeling that, if liability can be attached to the corporate
master, the courts do not care to add on the liability of the manager.',
Judicial reasons for refusing to hold the manager liable have been
clearly stated: (1) in the first place, economic positions are so differ-
ent that one could hardly ascribe to the corporation and the manager
the same legal position'7 -especially since vicarious liability is based
essentially on differing economic positions of the parties; (2) the
work that is performed is for the benefit of the corporate master, not
the manager,8 who has no interest in the profits of the business ;19
(3) the manager is usually only a better paid wage-earner without
the ability to regain the loss that is available to the master ;20 (4) the
manager has in reality very little discretion to exercise 21 and often
has persons in supervisory levels superior to his own.22 As the Ten-
nessee court assessed the problem in Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v.
Sessler ,23 the consequences of an extension of the rule of vicarious
liability to include a manager would be so onerous that no one would
care to rise to such a rank. Thus, simple and logical reasons of justice
prevail in most of our courts.
This, of course, does not mean that the manager should never be
liable, but the basis of his liability should be the same as that of any
other employee. A general supervisory capacity should not be suf-
ficient; the manager must be so connected with the wrongful act that,
tripped on chicken wire fencing which had been stretched on the sidewalk in front
of a store by the manager-apparently direct primary negligence-the court not
only failed to treat this as a problem involving liability of a manager, but allowed
the jury to find the manager not liable for direct negligence if it found that any
other employee was responsible for a failure to warn. Thus, the manager in the
Atterbury case was not necessarily even a concurrent tortfeasor.
15. In passing, one should note that, if there exists no fair basis for applying
respondeat superior to the manager, then any attempt to apply res ipsa loquitur
against the manager must also fail. See, e.g., Bryce v. Southern Ry., 125 Fed.
958 (4th Cir. 1903).
16. See, e.g., Atterbury v. Temple Stephens Co., 353 Mo. 5, 181 S.W.2d 659
(1944) (discussed in note 14 supra).
17. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
18. See Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951) ; S. H. Kress & Co.
v. Selph, 250 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Stone v. Cartwright, 6 Term R.
411, 101 Eng. Rep. 622 (K.B. 1795).
19. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951); Stone v. Cartwright,
6 Term R. 411, 101 Eng. Rep. 622 (K.B. 1795).
20. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, 250 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
21. Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951).
22. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, 250 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
23. 128 Tenn. 665, 163 S.W. 812 (1913).
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without regard to the liability of his corporate employer, he would
be personally liable for his act.2 4 If the supervisor effectively directed
the wrongful acts, or should have known his orders would cause
damage, he, of course, would be liable.25
There are, however, cases which indicate the manager may be
vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The
foremost example is the case of Orcutt v. Century Building Co.28
Plaintiff, injured by a falling elevator in a building managed by the
defendant, alleged defective construction and maintenance and neg-
ligent operation of an elevator located in the building. The Missouri
Supreme Court held the management agent liable for both the defec-
tive condition and negligent operation, allegedly concurrent. Obvi-
ously, by holding the agent liable for negligent operation by the
elevator operator, respondeat superior had been adopted as the basis
of liability.7 To insure there would be no doubt as to the applicability
of vicarious liability to the building management agent, the court
stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would apply.2 8 However
fair may have been the decision of the Missouri court in the Orcutt
case under its own peculiar circumstances,2 9 one may question the
propriety of applying res ipsa loquitur to supervisors, superintendents
and managers. A Mississippi court apparently used this doctrine
in finding the general suerintendent of a bottling works liable to a
24. Frorer v. Baker, 137 Ill. App. 588 (1907). See Brown v. Lent, 20 Vt.
529 (1848).
25. Ellis v. Southern Ry., 72 S.C. 465, 52 S.E. 228 (1905); Restatement, Agency
2d § 351 (1958).
In stream pollution cases in which pollution is the result of mining operations
the courts do not seem hesitant to hold the general mining superintendent liable.
Hindson v. Markle, 171 Pa. 138 (1895); Nunnelly v. Southern Iron Co., 94 Tenn.
397, 29 S.W. 361 (1895). The courts do, however, hold the superintendent liable
for direct negligence since they are of the opinion that he either knew or should
have known of the pollution and did nothing to change the mining operations.
26. 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1906).
27. However, the Orcutt case does not, in light of all the circumstances, seem
unjust, since one really could not equate the building management company to
the type of supervisor under consideration in this article. In this case the de-
fendant may as well have been treated as the ultimate master-owner. The de-
fendant was Mississippi Valley Trust Company, acting as trustee of a deed of trust
covering the Century Building in the City of St. Louis, and as trustee had irrev-
ocable power to rent the building and collect rents, pay taxes, pay ground rent,
pay the interest on bonds secured by the deed of trust, pay all expenses in regard
to the maintenance, repair and management of the building, and pay for insurance.
For its services, the defendant was given three and one half per cent of all monies
collected. The defendant further had complete discretion as to rental terms and
the amount expended upon repair, maintenance and management, and had the
power to hire and fire employees.
28. Id. at 440, 99 S.W. at 1065 (dictum).
29. See note 27 supra.
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consumer injured by deleterious substances found in a bottle of
Coca-Cola.30 Thus, according to this Mississippi court, manufacturing
supervisors are personally liable for improper actions of subordinate
employees and for defective conditions of the machinery and premises.
There are a few courts which, while expressly upholding the doc-
trine of respondeat superior in its broad application to intermediate
supervisory personnel, indicate some reaction against the doctrine.
For example, in S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph,31 a Texas court found that
the manager of a retail merchandising outlet could be liable for the
action of his subordinates if he failed to take "proper measures" to
insure that the floor of the premises was in safe condition. What will
constitute "proper measures" was held to be a jury question-the
court indicating that what may be "proper measures" for the manager
are not necessarily what they are for the ultimate master. In Texas,
it is not inconsistent for the jury to return a verdict for the manager
and against the ultimate corporate master, although both could be
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The same result may be reached under Missouri Law. Orcutt -
dictated that respondeat superior was applicable in this state. So, in
Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co.,33 the court said (1) it may be that the
manager is liable for the acts of his employees, 34 and (2) as to condi-
tions his duty is the same as that of the ultimate employer,," and in
spite of these two pronouncements the court finds nothing inconsistent
with a verdict in favor of the manager and against the ultimate cor-
porate manager. The Stith case was followed by Devine V. Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co.,38 which made it clear that respondeat superior
was applicable to managers, but which in dealing with the jury's ver-
dict in favor of the manager and against the ultimate master found no
inconsistency because the court treated Kroger as the possessor. The
court, apparently and all too obviously, forgot its other pronounce-
ments that the manager is to be treated as an occupier-Oroutt,'7
Lambert v. Jones, 8 and Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co.P-in order to find
30. Bufldn v. Grisham, 157 Miss. 746, 128 So. 563 (1930). The court found the
superintendent responsible for the proper operation of the manufacturing process,
for if the operations had been properly conducted no deleterious substance could
have entered the bottle. The court did not consider the effect of negligence of a
subordinate.
31. 250 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
32. 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1906).
33. 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447 (1935).
34. Id. at 492, 79 S.W.2d at 460 (dictum).
35. Id. at 485, 79 S.W.2d at 455-56.
36. 349 Mo. 621, 162 S.W.2d 813 (1942).
37. 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1906).
38. 339 Mo. 677, 98 S.W.2d 752 (1936).
39. 336 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447 (1934).
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consistency. In light of these cited Missouri cases and the discussion
below, if the manager is liable as a possesssor and is responsible by
reason of respondeat superior, as the Missouri courts have consistently
indicated, then there is no way to justify a finding for the manager
but against the ultimate master, since both have the same basis of
liability in Missouri. Thus, while giving lip service to an application
of respondeat superior against the manager, the Missouri courts have
failed to effectuate this extension of liability, apparently failing to see
the inconsistency created. 4° The above Texas and Missouri cases in-
dicate difficulties of extending liability to the manager. Juries may
not allow it,' 1 and perhaps because the court's own reaction is much
the same as the jury's, it finds some reason to justify the inconsistency
of verdicts. It is unfortunate that these courts do not adopt the
majority view, which not only seems to be the only fair view of the
law and the only one socially justifiable, but would eliminate the
necessity of finding an "out" for one who it decrees should be liable.
THE MANAGER AND THE LAW OF OCcuPIERS OF LAND
According to the great weight of authority, however, the manager
is not liable for the negligence of an employee acting under his gen-
eral supervision when that negligence itself is the cause of injury.
But often it may be that the negligence of the subordinate employee
results in a defective condition which in turn is the cause of the in-
jury. If some basis can be found for placing upon the manager the
duty to prevent or remove the defective condition, then the situation
might be handled in a different way, by treating the manager as a
possessor and occupier of land.
One might do well to start off with the proposition that the agent is
under a duty to prevent land and chattels in his control from harming
others.' 2 In this regard, the manager of a retail outlet, the supervisor
or superintendent of a project may be treated much the same as the
real estate management agent. In the case of the latter, control of the
property is the basis of liability and the agent's duty to invitees be-
comes an obligation independent of his agency.
43
When control of the property by the managing agent is complete
there is no reason why the courts should have difficulty in holding
40. See De Moulin v. Roetheli, 189 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1945).
41. But see Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co., 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1958).
42. Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 23 N.E. 384 (1890); Stith v. J. J. Newberry
Co., 336 Mo. 467, 485, 79 S.W.2d 447, 455 (1934) ; Mechem, Outlines Agency § 348
(1952) ; Restatement, Agency 2d § 355 (1958).
43. Baird v. Shipman, supra note 42; Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester,
180 Ind. 357, 101 N.E. 915 (1913); Lough v. John Davis & Co., 30 Wash. 204,
70 Pac. 491 (1902).
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him liable. For example, in Lambert v. Jones,44 one defendant was
president of the corporation which owned the building and had per-
sonal charge of the management of the building. For these duties he
was paid by the corporate owner. The court held him liable for failure
to repair a loose step on the second floor stairway, the basis of liability
resting on his personal assumption of complete and exclusive control
of the building as manager.45
Although failure to have control would be fatal,4 6 complete and
absolute control is not essential. It would seem that the basis of liabil-
ity is satisfied if the real estate management agent had sufficient
authority and control to prevent or repair the particular defective
condition.47 The Kansas City Court of Appeals summed up the matter
as follows:
[A]n agent of the owner should be held responsible for injuries
caused by the condition of premises in the possession or under the
control of the agent where the condition is one for which he is
responsible and the injury is such as he would be liable for if he
were controlling the premises on his own account.48
44. 339 Mo. 677, 98 S.W.2d 752 (1936).
45. "[W]here an agent of a corporate owner has complete control and manage-
ment over property, which if not properly maintained might create such a con-
dition as would cause injury to third persons rightfully upon and expected to
frequently be, in considerable numbers, upon [the premises] which the public was
invited to use on so many occasions, .. . such agent not only has a duty to his
principal to exercise ordinary care . . . but also . .. a duty to the public as well."
Id. at 687, 98 S.W.2d at 758.
See also Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, supra note 43; Orcutt v.
Century Bldg. Co., supra note 32. In both cases it would appear that the control
of the trust company was absolute and the true owner had little or nothing to say
in regard to the management of the building. See also Ellis v. McNaughton, 76
Mich. 237, 42 N.W. 1113 (1889).
For the necessary control required of managing agents to find them liable for
defective conditions of elevators, compare Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Watson Elevator Co., 253 N.Y. 404, 171 N.E. 688 (1930), with Orcutt v. Century
Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1906). This writer believes that under
Missouri law the Zurich case could have been decided so as to find liability.
46. Eads v. YWCA, 325 Mo. 577,29 S.W.2d 701 (1930).
47. Baird v. Shipman, supra note 42; Joshmer v. Fred Weber Contractors, Inc.,
294 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. App. 1956); Lough v. John Davis & Co., supra note 43.
48. Edwards v. E. B. Murray & Co., 305 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Mo. App. 1957).
See also Carson v. Quinn, 127 Mo. App. 525, 105 S.W. 1088 (1907). Cf. Weigel
v. Reintjes, 154 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. App. 1941) (rev'd on other grounds).
However, not all courts are in agreement with the above textual propositions.
See, e.g., Wendland v. Berg, 188 Iowa 202, 174 N.W. 410 (1919). In the earlier
cases liability often turned on a misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction, liability
being based solely on the former which was quite strictly applied. See, e.g., Dean
v. Brock, 11 Ind. App. 507, 28 N.E. 829 (1894) ; Delaney v. Rochereau, 34 La. Ann.
1123 (1882). But for the better view rejecting this distinction as meaningless,
see Baird v. Shipman, supra note 42; Rising v. Ferris, 216 Ill. App. 252 (1919);
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Agents who can not repair or remove a defective condition without
first getting permission of the owner are not held liable. 49 But, as in-
dicated above, the agent is liable to the extent of the control he is
authorized to exercise. For example, in Giles v. Moundridge Milling
Co.,50 the defendant mill manager had authority to make ordinary
repairs, but had no authority to make large repairs without first se-
curing her master's permission. Plaintiff fell into an elevator shaft as
a result of the defective condition of a bar guarding the shaft. The
defendant manager prior to the accident had supports on which
the bar rested repaired. The court held that this was sufficient for the
jury to find the manager liable on the ground that it was an ordinary
repair within her discretion.
When the control of the store manager is similar to that of the real
estate management agent, there would seem to be no logical reason
to distinguish between them.51 The basis of the liability is the same-
control, rather than agency.52 Thus, the manager receives fair treat-
ment when he is deemed to be a possessor and occupier of land.;
3
But it should be recognized that the store manager may be in a
slightly different position from that of the usual real estate manage-
ment agent. That is, are not store managers more limited in their
control and is not their control much less exclusive than that of their
real estate cousins? The real estate management agent, usually
through his own employees, is chiefly concerned with conditions of the
land and the repair of same; on the other hand, the main concentration
of the retail outlet manager is increasing sales, conditions of the land
Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., supra note 32; Ryan v. Standard Oil Co., 144 S.W.2d
170 (Mo. App. 1940) (dictum); Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, supra
note 43.
When an independent contractor orginally created the defective condition or
improperly repaired a pre-existing defective condition, one court treated the
managing agent who had full control as to repairs merely as an employing agent
rather than as the possessor, thus freeing the managing agent of liability. White
v. Macoubray, 309 Pa. 266, 163 Atl. 521 (1932). See also Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In light of the discussion in the text of the above in
regard to realty management agents, the use of "independent contractor" to defeat
liability is obviously a "red herring."
49. Peterson v. Brune, 273 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1954) ; Brown v. Yeckel, Earickson
& Co., 129 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1939).
Subordinate employees generally are not treated as possessors and occupiers
of land. See Ryan v. Standard Oil Co., 144 S.W. 2d 170 (Mo. App. 1940).
50. 351 Mo. 568, 173 S.W.2d 745 (1943).
51. See, e.g., Rising v. Ferris, 216 I1. App. 252 (1919).
52. Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co., 336 Mo. 467, 485, 79 S.W.2d 447, 455 (1935);
Restatement, Agency 2d § 355 (1958).
53. See Landreth v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 74 F. Supp. 801 (W.D. Mo. 1947);
Dillon v. Wallace, 306 P.2d 1044 (Cal. App. 1957); Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co.,
supra note 52; Dean v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 300 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1957) (semble).
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being only secondary and incidental thereto. Real estate management
is based on preservation, whereas merchandising and selling are more
progressive and pushing. In the selling area would not the corporate
master-owner be more actively interested in directing the affairs of
the company in all fields of endeavor? As in Franklin v. May Depart-
ment Stores Co.,5 4 one might well question whether the manager of a
multi-million dollar merchandising operation has exclusive control
against all but the corporate board of directors. Hence, it is not sur-
prising that some courts refuse to hold the manager liable as a posses-
sor and occupier of land.'5 For example, one court insulated the man-
ager from liability by finding that the existence of or failure to re-
move a defective condition could have been due to policies of the
corporate owner-master for which the manager was not responsible."
Nevertheless, if the manager is held liable, liability can only be
justified by treating the manager as a possessor and occupier of land.
The reasons for refusing to allow an extension of the doctrine of
respondeat superior are partially inapplicable when the manager is
treated as a possessor. As a possessor and occupier, he owes a duty to
the public to maintain the premises in a safe condition. However, one
should recognize that the presence of many defective conditions may
be attributed to the negligence of the manager's subordinate em-
ployees-that a defective condition may have been either created by
them or permitted to remain by their failure to report it to their
superior. Thus, the problem of imposing vicarious liability upon the
manager for a subordinate employee's negligence may also be present.
If one imputes either the negligence or the kmowledge of the subordi-
nate employee to his ultimate master-owner, one must ask whether
negligence or knowledge should also be imputed to the intermediary.
The above discussion of vicarious liability indicates that there should
be no liability imposed upon the manager when he has no personal
notice of the defect. Juries apparently agree, for their verdicts in
these defective condition cases are often for the manager and against
the employer.57
54. 25 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mo. 1938).
55. Duvall v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 496 (D. Ore. 1951).
See also Atterbury v. Temple Stephens Co., 353 Mo. 5, 181 S.W.2d 659 (1944).
56. Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres, 86 Cal. App. 2d 428, 194 P.2d 706
(1948).
57. See, e.g., Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres, supra note 56; De Moulin v.
Roetheli, 354 Mo. 425, 189 S.W.2d 562 (1945) ; Devine v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., 349 Mo. 621, 162 S.W.2d 813 (1942) ; Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co., supra note
52; S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, 250 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But see
Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co., 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1958).
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CONCLUSION
Apparently inconsistent jury verdicts bring the problem sharply
into focus. Since most courts treat the manager as a possessor, if
liability is imposed upon him at all, the problem of supposed incon-
sistency in the verdicts can be easily solved by recognition and accep-
tance of the above mentioned points. That is, if imputation of a sub-
ordinate employee's negligence to the manager is required to find the
manager negligent, the manager should not be held liable. There
should simply be a refusal to hold the manager-possessor vicariously
liable. No court thus far has expressly reached this position.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals calls for treating the manager
primarily as a possessor, but also requires him to take "proper mea-
sures" to insure that the premises are free of defects5 If the jury
determines that measures the manager adopted were reasonably well
suited to discover and prevent defects, then, even though another em-
ployee was negligent or had notice of the defect, the manager will not
be liable. 5
9
The only other way to remove the label of inconsistency of verdicts
is to give the jury a wider latitude in finding some additional negli-
gence over which the manager had no control-e.g., failure of the
corporate omer-master to provide sufficient personnel.60
Missouri law is so confused that there is no simple solution to the
problem. The courts have stated in chronological order that: the
real estate management agent is liable as a possessor and under re-
spondeat superior;61 the retail manager is liable as a possessor and
may be liable for acts of subordinate employees ;62 as custodian of a
building, the manager is liable for negligent conditions ;63 the manager
is liable under respondeat superior but not as a possessor, only the
ultimate corporate employer being liable as a possessor ;64 the manager
58. S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, supra note 57.
59. One should recognize that this is almost "double-talk," simply giving the
jury an "out." However, if "proper measures" were interpreted to mean that if
the manager himself inspected the premises at reasonable intervals and ordered
others to do so more often (whether they did so or not) and corrected such defects
upon their actual discovery by him or actual notice being given to him by a sub-
ordinate employee, then this "proper measures" test would certainly be worthy
of consideration.
60. Newman v. Fox West Coast Theatres, 86 Cal. App. 2d 428, 194 P.2d 706
(1948).
61. Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062 (1906).
62. Stith v. J. J. Newberry Co., 836 Mo. 467, 79 S.W.2d 447 (1935).
63. Lambert v. Jones, 339 Mo. 677, 98 S.W.2d 752 (1936).
64. Devine v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 349 Mo. 621, 162 S.W.2d 813
(1942).
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is not liable as a possessor and may or may not be liable otherwise.01
The most recent decision seems to treat the manager as a possessor.,"
The Missouri courts attempt to circumvent inconsistency of the ver-
dicts by saying that a corporate defendant is liable for defects as a
possessor regardless of the actions of any of its other employees. But
by continuously asserting the possibility of liability of the manager
under the doctrine of respondeat superior and refusing to hold him
not subject to vicarious liability, the Missouri courts adopt a harmful
and unfair rule which at sometime they will be forced either to imple-
ment as law or to strike down. Until that time, supervisory employees
in Missouri occupy the onerous position of being liable for the negli-
gent acts of their subordinate employees whose loyalty, trust and
ultimate control repose in another.
65. De Moulin v. Roetheli, 189 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1945). See also Atterbury
v. Temple Stephens Co., 353 Mo. 5, 181 S.W.2d 659 (1944).
66. Harbourn v. Katz Drug Co., 318 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. 1958). One could argue
from the facts of this case that the court need not have treated the manager as an
occupier, since the facts indicated direct primary negligence on his part, but the
court treated the corporate master-operator and the manager together as occupiers.
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